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EROSION OF TRADE UNION POWER
THROUGH MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES?
Hans Gunter*
I.

A.

INTRODUCTION

National Focus of Trade Union Efforts

The present article explores the effects of the operations and
growth of multinational enterprises (MNEs)1 on power, role, and
legitimation of the trade unions within the national industrial relations systems in the industrialized countries of Western Europe
and North America. This study neglects the effects of MNEs on
international union cooperation and labor solidarity, which are
dealt with in other contributions to this issue. This focus reflects
the author's thesis that the main trade union concern and strategy
in the countries in question is the integration of MNEs into the
existing national industrial relations setting, while the development of border-crossing, "transnational" relations with these enterprises is a much weaker trend. Most of the activities of international union organizations vis-a-vis MNEs are geared toward the
integration of these enterprises into the environment of the nationstate and the strengthening of local union counterparts (a second
best solution to the more difficult transnational union strategies).
The national orientation of the trade unions facing the MNE is
not surprising. In the Western European countries the trade unions
historically developed together with the nation-state. The main
base, power position, and effective field of union action coincide
with the territory of the state which sets the essential economic
and political conditions for trade union activities. Through growing involvement in national level decision-making and the administration of the welfare-state (social security, incomes policy, social
contract, concerted action, economic and social planning), the unions are becoming even more integrated in their respective national
* International Institute for Labor Studies (ILLS), Geneva. Responsibility for
the opinions expressed remains with the author. They are in no way attributable
to the IlLS.
1. The term "multinational enterprise" is used in this article, rather than the
more frequently found terms "corporation" or "firms", to stress the importance
of border-crossing economic-not legal-links for the phenomenon.
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frameworks. 2 Regional integration, in particular the EEC, has not
significantly modified this situation thus far.'
The coordination of international trade unions against MNEs is
certainly hampered greatly in the countries under consideration by
differences in national labor laws, 4 organization principles, collective agreement practices, political affiliations, and ideologies
within the labor movement. The slow growth of such international
union coooperation, however, is undoubtedly influenced also by
the conviction that MNEs can be effectively dealt with, at least
in part, within the national context by organized labor, especially
if it allies with government.
B. Identifying Relevant Factors of Concern
In the structural-functional view, the specific problems for the
nationally organized unions stem primarily from the MNEs transnational activities and centrally coordinated decision-making
power. This incongruence in levels of decision-making and territorial competence is typically accompanied by the giant dimension

of the MNEs, and their modern technology and management
methods, which are often superior to those of exclusively nationally operating firms. There is little doubt, therefore, that the power
balance tends to shift in favor of business, even more so where
MNEs hold the key positions in growth sectors of the economy
thereby making them indispensable partners of governments.
However, these problems for the unions are attenuated, modified,
counteracted, or at least hidden, by a number of environmental
and behaviorial factors in each country. The relevant factors include socio-cultural, economic, and political conditions as well as
behavioral patterns of MNEs and unions within the particular
country. They might be chosen for the construction of a typology
of situations and relations regarding the interaction of MNEs and
labor in the various countries and economic sectors.' Even without
this systematic analysis it is very obvious that there exists a
2.

E.

PIEHL, MULTINATIONALE KONZERNE UND INTERNATIONALE GEWERK-

SCHAFTSBEWEGUNG 212 (1974).

3. Gunter, International Collective Bargainingand Regional Economic Integration: Some Reflections on Experience in the EEC, in TRANSNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 321 (H. Gunter ed. 1972).
4.
INDUS.

5.
6.

K.W. Wedderburn, MultinationalEnterprises and National LaborLaw, 1

L.J., 12-19 (1972).
supra note 2, at 229-48.

PIEHL,

A typology of this kind is missing so far.
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world-wide variation in the analytical framework for labor dealing
with MNEs, depending on the various constellations of the factors
referred to. In many industrialized countries of Western Europe
and North America the problems of a national labor force dealing
with MNEs are counter-acted by a substantial degree of voluntary
(learning processes of management) or forced (labor law and practices, union power) integration of the enterprises into the national
system of industrial relations. The common objectives of management and labor within the productivity-wage-employment complex, prevailing partnership ideologies, and typically high levels of
economic activity and employment all serve to mollify the differences between international labor and MNEs.
Changes in environmental factors, in particular the economic

recession and the partly related change in trade union attitudes,
have brought the areas of division between labor and MNEs into
sharper focus. For example, unions have displayed greater militancy on issues of interest representation and world-wide resource
allocation. Several recent developments will be reviewed in the
following pages in an attempt to clarify if, and how, the union
position within the Western countries is affected by the MNEs.
The various areas for review include: (1) industrial relations; (2)
investment and employment problems; (3) wider social policy
goals of unions; (4) codes of conduct for MNEs; and (5) international union cooperation.
II.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

Under this heading two main areas of concern are to be distinguished: (1) the direct initiatives of management introduced in the
plants of the MNEs; and (2) the induced effects of MNEs on the
industrial relations systems because of their size and particular
organizational structures.
A.

Management Initiatives

Several of the direct initiatives of management may cause irritations for the unions; others may have a more far-reaching influence
on the balance of power in labor relations. The transfer of certain
MNE personnel practices from the country of origin to a foreign
subsidiary, undertaken mostly because of productivity considerations or the desire to duplicate a familiar home environment, often
fall in the former category (e.g., differences in management style,

carrier regulations, fringe benefits). In the long run, the learning
processes which international management undergoes while oper-
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ating in an alien culture tend to reduce possible conflicts with the
unions. Central problems for the interest representation function
of unions arise, however, where the policies of MNEs touch the
area of trade union recognition, 7 or where foreign subsidiaries opt
to stay outside employer organizations and the established practice of industry-wide collective bargaining.8 Taking the countries
under review as a whole, these appear to be rather rare events.
Recognition problems with MNEs may have different effects on
the interest representation functions of trade unions than those
encountered with local firms. Thus, a policy of nQn-recognition
of a subsidiary may be the cutcome of a global company strategy
which hits unions in several countries and which would need to be
taken up with central headquarters which are outside the reach of
the unions in the host countries of MNEs. It has been reported that
recognition problems in the United Kingdom with foreign-owned
companies are much more widespread with regard to staff unionism than manual labor, thus affecting one category of employees
which is traditionally difficult to unionize.' Although the frequency of recognition problems in the United Kingdom was about
the same in local firms as in MNEs, the local firms were normally
small family enterprises, whereas the MNEs were large enterprises
with substantially higher employement figures. 0 However, in the
very sensitive field of union recognition the issue might frequently
be a "polemical one."" The finding that the degree of unionization
is lower in many MNEs than the national average 2 generally
7.

Examples of trade union recognition problems in the United Kingdom

(usually with enterprises of American origin) are, for instance, given in the TUC
publication, REPORT OF A CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES, INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES 9-10 (1970). Regarding examples for several other European
countries such as Belgium, Germany and France, see, for instance, INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR OFFICE, MULTINATIONALS IN WESTERN EUROPE: THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

EXPERIENCE 4-9 (1976).
8. REPORT OF A CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES, INTERNATIONAL
COMPANIES 10-14 (1970).
9. Id. at 9.
10. Steuer & Gennard, The IndustrialRelations of Foreign-OwnedSubsidiaries in the United Kingdom, 9 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 155 (1971).
11. N. McCrea, Report on Research Findings Relating to Great Britain, pre-

pared for a Research Meeting on Multinational Corporations and Labor, IlLSIEME Doc. No. 4131, at 17 (Int'l Inst. Labour Studies 1973).
12. T. Etty & K. Tudyka, Konflikte in der Arbeitswelt 29 (an unpublished

paper for a scientific symposium on Multinational Enterprises and Interest Representation of Wage Labour, Hannover, October 1-3, 1975).
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should be a more serious concern to the unions although the explanation could be found in such factors as the labor force mix, or
the MNE operation in new areas with little union tradition, rather
than in any particular union hostility towards multinational management.
Certain industrial relations initiatives by multinational management may have improved the position of the unions. The introduction of "productivity bargaining" in the United Kingdom
(mainly through foreign firms) since the early 1960s may be taken
as an example. The unions gave up certain control rights of shop
stewards and gained higher wages in the process. Since the improved wages were attractive for the great masses of the workers,
the management initiative should actually have increased, rather
than decreased, the legitimation of unions in the eyes of their
members. This interpretation seems justified because "productivity bargaining" was subsequently emulated by an important number of local enterprises with union acceptance, or at least, tolerance.
Recent management initiatives to modify the organization of
work in which MNEs have taken a leading role (such as job
enlargement, enrichment as well as autonomy of work groups) are
ambiguous with regard to the complex of union power, influence,
and legitimation. In many trade union circles they are considered
a potential menance because they tend to increase the identification of workers with their enterprises to the possible detriment of
labor solidarity.' 3 On the other hand, the Scandinavian and, more
importantly, the Italian experiences' 4 demonstrate that these management initiatives can be used by the unions to improve their
position in the enterprise by obtaining participation rights or by
imposing corollary conditions regarding work organization, workload, employment guarantees, and new wage standards, mainly
through the instrument of collective bargaining. In this way unions
or other representatives of workers obtain competence in areas that
were the exclusive prerogative of management or they achieve
longstanding workers' goals-e.g., the reduction of wage differentials and the abolition of "scientific" job classification systems.
Special initiatives of multinational management aimed at modifying present industrial relations policies are nevertheless more the
exception than the rule in the Western industrialized countries.
13. See Delamotte, The Attitudes of French and Italian Trade Unions to the
"Humanisation"of Work, 1 LABoUR AND SociEty 49 (1976).
14. Rollier, The Organizationof Work and IndustrialRelations in the Italian
EngineeringIndustry, 1 LABoUR AND Socwry 81 (1976).
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The available studies point out that despite culturally-determined
variations in management styles and labor practices, MNEs generally integrate highly in the national industrial relations systems,
particularly in the areas of collective bargaining and wage policies.' 5 Voluntary adjustments to local conditions by multinational
management, the effects of statutory labor norms, labor practices,
and the presence of strong unions contribute to this state of affairs.
The MNEs integration into national industrial relations systems
is also promoted because labor relations (often a secondary management function) are, under normal conditions, within the competence of subsidiary management in the various host countries.
For all these reasons, the interest representation role of trade unions remains intact in many essential aspects with respect to the
MNE. The substantial integration into the local industrial relations setting also explains why actual wages and labor conditions
in MNEs greatly resemble those in comparable local enterprises.)6
Such an adjustment is clearly in the cost-interest of North American enterprises implanted in Europe. Trade unions' success in
exploiting a higher pay potential partially explains why wages
and labor conditions are better in foreign enterprises than in local
enterprises.
B. Induced Effects of MNEs
MNEs exert significant influence on industrial relations not so
much through specific initiatives of management and the emulation of innovations by local firms, as through their organizational
and structural properties and their size. This induced change is
naturally more difficult to evaluate than the direct initiatives of
management. Many of these induced effects can be classified as a
reinforcement, retardment, or reversal of trends already existing in
the industrial relations systems. By their size and their role in the
concentration of capital, multinational enterprises reinforce the
existing trend in Western Europe towards more (formal or informal) plant level bargaining. While this trend may increase the role
15. Some more recent information confirming this view can be found, in
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, MULTINATIONALS IN WESTERN EUROPE,

7; M. Jedel & D. Kujawa, U.S.

supra note

DEPT. COMMERCE, OFFICE INT'L FINANCE AND

INVESTMENT, MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTORS IN THE UNITED STATES

16.

(1976).

ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DES EMPLOYEURS, LES ENTREPRISES MULTINA-

TIONALES: LEUR POLITIQUE ET LEURS PRATIQUES RiELES DANS LE DOMAINE SOCIAL

(1974).

16
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of plant level unions and general worker representation (such as
the works councils), it also fosters greater "enterprise corporatism." In several countries, these tendencies toward enterprise
corporatism are disliked by both national unions and employer
organizations because a reduction in their control and coordination
power results, particularly with respect to wages and income
policies.
Thus far, fears that workers' solidarity in the Western industrialized countries would be negatively affected by the emergence of
such enterprise-oriented (and possibly transnational) labor relations in MNEs have not found much confirmation. Similarly, the
possibility that MNEs reinforce a trend towards "dual labor markets" aligning "established labor" in well remunerated and relatively secure employment against a segment of "social marginals"
in substandard, precarious employment, who have to pay the
higher social costs of growth or recession, seems to be much
greater
7
in the developing than in the industrialized countries.'
An example of a trend retardment and even reversal through
MNEs can be found in the area of worker boardroom participation.
In Holland, enterprises with a substantial foreign business component are, for instance, exempted from certain participation provisions which tend to retard the trend towards participation. Rights
of workers to participate in economic decision-making at the enter-

prise level, instituted by the German co-determination legislation,
are being crippled by the final decision-making power of the foreign multinational headquarters (a trend reversal). The same observation applies to other social innovations in Europe, such as
collective agreements on the protection of workers against rationalization measures. Thus, the paradoxical situation arises that, with
the spread of the participation idea, ever larger proportions of
workers obtain new rights of decision-sharing while, as a consequence of international capital concentration, the effective use of
these rights becomes doubtful for a likewise increasing percentage
of the workforce. Moreover, in crisis situations the normally decentralized, industrial relations management of MNEs tends to lose
its autonomy. For instance, in the event of a strike of long duration
in a subsidiary, which may endanger productivity and profitability
of the MNE as a whole, headquarters management usually intervenes in a consulting or decision shaping capacity.'8 Hence, in17. For the development and fuller application of these concepts, see Cox,
Labour and the Multinationals,FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan. 1975, at 351-52.
18. For a description of some typical intervention procedures of headquarters
management see K. KUJAWA, INTERNATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS MANAGEMENT IN THE
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dustrial relations in MNEs are "latently transnational."19
It is mainly in such crisis situations, characterized by the involvement of headquarters management in industrial relations
and more so in major employment/investment2o decision-making,
that the local worker representatives realize that the MNEs are of
different character than the purely nationally operating firms.
Threats by management to shift production to other countries or
to withhold investments have the same effect and are denounced
by the unions as a specific tactic of MNEs to discipline labor in
conflict situations,2 although cases in which they have been actually carried out appear to be very rare. Central decision-making
by MNEs contributes to the frequent union feeling that shutdowns
are made "arbitrarily" by multinational management. 2
The special nature of multinational enterprises is also reflected
in the area of provision of information to labor. A major, although
often not specified, union complaint about MNEs is "inadequate
information." 23 Certainly in countries where information policies of
enterprises versus labor representatives are determined in detail
by legislation, such as in the Federal Republic of Germany or in
France, these complaints may have less justification. However,
with few exceptions, 4 information provided concerning enterprise
policies, financial position, and future plans is limited to the unit
implanted in the country concerned, while worker representatives
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CHRYSLER, FORD AND GENERAL

MOTORS, 67-71, 116-118 & 171-174 (1971).

19. H.Gunter, An Overview of Some Researchon MultinationalCorporations
and Labour, IlLS BULL. No. 12, at 42.
20. Everett Kassalow concludes after a review of the pertinent literature, "It
is widely agreed that the general investment parameters, the major decisions to
expand or contract are determined by the home office of multinational companies." E. Kassalow, Multinational Corporations and Their Impact on Industrial
Relations 10 (an unpublished paper prepared for an International Conference on

Trends in Industrial and Labour Relations, Montreal, May 1976).
21.

A reproach found in one or the other form in all major union statements

on MNEs. A widely publicized example is the menace of Henry Ford to transfer
planned investments from the United Kingdom to the European continent and
to Asia. See
STORY

22.

PIEHL,

supra note 2, at 155; J.

MATHEWS, FORD STRIKE, THE WORKERS

137 (1972).
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, MULTINATIONALS IN WESTERN EUROPE,

supra

note 7, at 17.
23. Id. at 66.
24. Belgian legislation requires, for instance, the provision of information for
the MNE as a whole. A French law entitles works committees to be informed
about investments in other countries.
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may wish information for the enterprise as a whole.2" It can be
argued that information restricted to the operations in the country
of implantation is sufficient for collective bargaining purposes.
This reasoning does not hold good, on the other hand, for information needed to appreciate employment and job security problems
which are made or influenced by the headquarters of MNEs in line
with overall company strategies and performance. Information
(and consultation) requirements, their substance, and timing
therefore take a prominent place in the various discussions of standards of conduct for MNEs.
III.

INVESTMENT AND EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS

During the post-World War II period of unprecedented economic
growth in the Western industrialized countries, two major convictions developed in influential trade union circles: (1) that the utlimate economic decision-making prerogatives of management
needed to be preserved in market economies in the interest of
efficiency; and (2) that the main responsibility for economic
growth and employment had to be vested in the national governments. It followed from these convictions that the workforce had
to see itself much as the dependent variable with respect to the
management of the economies by employers and governments.
Adjustments through changes in jobs, skills, location of workers,
and correlated retraining had thus to be accepted as the orientation norm for labor. Greater mobility of labor became a shared goal
of the industrial relations partners.
The greater masses of the workers benefited visibly from this
orientation norm during recent decades, as continuing high employment levels and real wage increases in most countries demonstrate. Rapid economic and technological change was accepted in
the interest of both goals by virtually all major union groupings in
the Western industrialized countries, with the possible exception
of the more hesitant British unions. The unions' main concern for
their members was compensation for workers affected by such
change. Even in declining sectors, such as coal and textiles, these
approaches were followed despite substantial legitimation problems for the unions. At the same time, under union pressure, the
concept of active labor market policies was developed in several
25.

In this context see R. Blanpain, Provision of Information, WORKERS'
90-92 (Documents prepared for an International Management
Seminar convened by the OECD, March 5-8, 1975).

PARTICIPATION
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countries in Western Europe, the foremost among them being
Sweden. 6
This general background explains to a large extent why the investment and employment behavior of MNEs has not been, at
least until recently, a central problem for the Western European
unions. Unions have questioned whether the widely made, but
controversial, assumption (based more on deductive reasoning
than on detailed studies) that MNEs have benefited employment
in industrialized countries" is justified or not. Structural labor
force change induced by MNEs, especially because of their policies
of mergers and takeovers, was recognized as a somewhat disquieting labor market factor by the unions since accompanying rationalization measures are frequently connected with job reductions.
Similarly, the transfer of production lines from Europe to low wage
countries (for instance in textiles and electronics), although relatively small so far, received unions' attention. However, as long as
the economies produced sufficient alternative employment possibilities, structural change originating from multinational, as well
as local, enterprises did not erode the basis of the "progressive"
adjustment ideology espoused by the trade unions.
These conditions are about to change profoundly under the influence of the present recession. Lack of employment alternatives
depreciate the goal of greater labor mobility and make job security
a sensitive issue. Already in earlier years, examples of sporadic
resistance of workers against plant closures had sent signals of this
attitudinal change. In respect to multinational enterprises, the
Akzo case (1972) (an example of the successful resistance of Dutch
and German workers to plans of labor force cuts in several European units of the firm) has such a signal value.28 Furthermore, it
demonstrated that border-crossing solidarity action by labor can,

under certain circumstances, counteract employment decisions of
multinational management.
26. For a more detailed analysis of union attitudes towards economic decisionmaking, see H. Gunter, Trade Unions and IndustrialPolicies in Western Europe,
in WEST EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL POLICIES 93 (S.J. Warnecke & E. Juleiman eds.

1975).
27.

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES

ON EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING 31 (1976).

28. For more detailed accounts of the Akzo case according to a union perspective, see Hoffman & Langwieler, Noch sind wir da! Arbeiter im multinationalen
Konzern, RoRORo AKTUELL, Oct. 1974; PIEHL, supra note 2, at 180-99. A very
critical analysis is found in Northrup & Ronan, MultinationalCollectiveBargain-

ing Activity: The FactualRecord in Chemicals, Glass and Rubber Tires, (pts. I2), 9(1), 9(2) COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 112, 63 (1974).
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For some years, real or alleged job exports of MNEs have become a critical area in the United States much beyond the sole
concern of unions, although its nature and magnitude are highly
controversial matters.29 The existing management-initiated studies are based on small unrepresentative samples and conclude that
the major employment implications of MNEs are structural
changes rather than effects on the general level of employment 3
Thus, special occupational groups and unskilled workers in general
seem to have lost the most jobs. On the other hand, the employmentof clerical and technical staff appears to have increased in
headquarters of the United States firms.
Trade union power and legitimation are more affected in the
United States by structural changes in employment than in most
of the Western European countries. Because the American unions
are usually organized on an enterprise and occupational basis, unemployment in certain occupations, and more especially plant closures, directly call into question the relevance of union organization. " These problems are accentuated by the comparatively less
developed retraining methods and adjustment assistance for displaced workers in North America than in Western Europe. It is
therefore plausible that the MNEs may act as a catalyst in transforming the largely bipartite (labor/employer) industrial relations
in North America toward more state intervention in line with a
European industrial relations model.32 This trend appears likely
since other options for the American unions, such as the worldwide harmonization of labor standards or claims for protectionist
commercial policies, like the Burke-Hartke Bill, have not been

very successful thus far.
This short review of labor developments in response to the
MNEs suggests that the employment incidence of these enterprises emerges as a central theme of MNE/union confrontation,
possibly pushing aside the usual industrial relations concerns. In
29. R. G. HAWKINS, CENTER FOR MULTINATIONAL STUDIES REPORT, JOB DISPLACEMENT AND THE MULTINATIONAL FImR: A METHODOLOGIcAL REVIEW (1972).

30. See, e.g., R.B. STOBOUGH, P. TELESION & J. DE LA TORRE, CENTE FOR
MULTINATIONAL STUDIES REPORT, THE EFFECTs OF U.S. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
IN MANUFACTURING ON THE

U.S.

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS,

U.S.

CHANGES IN SKILL COMPOSITION OF EMPLOYMENT (1973).
31. Cox, Labor and TransnationalRelations, 25 INT. ORG.

EMPLOYMENT AND

567 (1971).
32. Heise, The Multinational Corporation and Industrial Relations: The
American Approach Compared with the European, 28 INDUS. REL. (CANADA), 54
(1973).
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the industrialized countries under consideration, achievement and
maintenance of high employment levels coupled with job and in-

come security are now established priority goals in which governments ally with the trade unions. Wage employment not only provides livelihood and status for an ever growing segment of the
population, but also provides social representation and access to
extended social security as a result of labor legislation and union
pressure. In these circumstances, the future legitimation of MNEs
may increasingly depend upon their contribution to employment,
job security, training, and the social upgrading of workers, 33 while
in the past their GNP, balance of payments, and modernization
effects were in the forefront for national policy makers.
Furthermore, many earlier writings stressed the world-wide welfare effects 34 of the MNEs, occasionally incorporating the expectation that these enterprises would prepare the coming global society,31 thereby outflanking the "old institutions," in particular the
nation-state.36 However, nation-states and other institutions
within their confines, such as unions, show an astonishing vitality
that will make them the bodies primarily responsible for the welfare of people for a long time to come. The world-wide effects of
MNEs, which are difficult to evaluate in the first place, are not
immediately relevant to the national institutions. Despite a commitment to international solidarity, these institutions remain primarily interested in the welfare and employment effects that
MNEs exert within their areas of competence (nation, industry,
plant). The recognition that these interests depend on the global
strategies of MNEs is, especially in the present recessionary cli-

mate, undoubtedly a prime motivation for states and unions to
seek more national or international controls and guidelines for
multinational business.
IV.

WIDE SOCIAL POLICY GOALS OF THE UNIONS

Traditionally, most of the Western European unions are committed to various ideas of societal change while the North Ameri33. H. GUNTER, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND LABOUR: A PROSPECTIVE
IILS-IEME Doc. No. 1057, at 4 (Int'l Inst. Labour Studies 1973).

VIEW,

34. AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD: Six LECTURES ON DmcRT INVESTMENTS (C.
Kindleberger ed. 1969).
35. Worton, The MultinationalCorporation:Administering Development in
A GlobalPolitical System, 11 MGT. INT'L REV. (1971).
36. Tanenbaum, The Survival of the Fittest, 3 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 13-20
(1968).
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can unions consider themselves more as bodies of interest representation within the existing liberal capitalist setting, with a pragmatic rather than dogmatic reaction to social problems. 7 These
ideas of societal change are usually pursued in alliance with political parties and range from reformist goals within the market economic capitalistic order (e.g., in Scandinavia and West Germany)
to that of overcoming this system, most often in a Marxist sen se.
For example, this is the long-term objective for parts of the French
and Italian union movements." For a number of analysts, the
growth of multinationals makes this social change more difficult
because it is supposed to entail the consolidation of the capitalist
system while the possibilities of union action are being reduced.3 9
Among the specific factors referred to in such assumptions are the
following: The increase in the imbalance of power between capital
and labor through the growth of MNEs; the erosion of reformist
social change because of the structural properties of MNEs (for
instance their effects on workers participation in management,
mentioned above); the conjunction of state and MNEs goals of
economic growth and modernization; and the danger of increasing
transnational capital concentration which counteract the functioning of democratic pluralism." Some of the critical views are variations of classic Marxist analysis, describing the MNEs as an expression of economic dominance in the phase of late capitalism,
which necessarily runs into conflict with major labor interests."
A number of developments seem to give support to a more dialectical view in which the growth of the MNE acts as an incentive
for the development of countervailing power and social reforms
within the confines of the nation-states. The spread of the idea of
worker participation in management in the Federal Republic of
Germany and several other Western European countries has cer37. W. Galenson & R.S. Smith, Labor in the Twentieth Century: The United
States 39 (an unpublished paper prepared for the 4th World Congress of the
International Industrial Relations Association, Geneva, September 6-10, 1976).
38. For a more detailed discussion of European unions' aims and strategies,
see E.

JACOBS, EUROPEAN TRADE UNIONISM

(1973).

39. See, e.g., L. Bergmann, Multinational Corporationsand Labour in the
EEC: A Survey of Research and Developments, IILS-IEME Doc. No. 1062, at
16-17 (Int'l Inst. Labour Studies 1973).
40. Mielke, MultinationaleKonzerne, InternationaleKapitalstrategienohne
Grenzen?, 11 DAS PARLAMENT 22 (1974).
41. See, e.g., Sweezy & Magdoff, Anmerkungen zur multinationalen
Korporation, 2 SOZIALISTISCHES JAHRBUCH 18-41 (1970); reprinted in English in
MONTHLY Ray., Oct.-Nov. 1969.
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tainly been spurred on by the increase of national and international capital concentration. Boardroom participation of workers,
its most far-reaching variation in Western countries, is a concept
mainly applied to the big and giant enterprises.42 Likewise, the
adoption of an EEC directive concerning the protection of workers
in cases of mass dismissals was accelerated by the Akzo case which
was debated in the European Parliament. Finally, German and
Dutch union influence forced the inclusion of participation provisions for enterprises as a whole in the European company draft
statute, which undoubtedly constitutes a social response to international capital concentration. Admittedly, it has also been the
main reason for deferring adoption of this statute.
Despite these measures and certain restrictive practices regarding foreign capital in countries like Austria, France, Italy, and
Sweden (as well as the greater controls being discussed or introduced in countries with liberal traditions such as Canada), clearly,
the operations of MNEs are generally judged as being compatible
with the economic and social developments supported by the influential political and social forces present in the Western industrial-

ized countries, including the majority of the unions. Reformist
change, aiming at more social constraints for the MNEs but not
their elimination, remains the common denominator of all mdjor
parties involved in labor developments regarding these enterprises.
Unlike the situation in the Third World, the question of nationalization of MNEs, for instance, is not on the agenda in any of the
countries considered. Even in the United Kingdom, where nationalizations are a pragmatic goal of the party in power, MNEs escape
such treatment. Thus, during the recent government rescue operations of the Chrysler subsidiary in the United Kingdom such a
measure was never considered contrary to the practice applied in
the rescue operations for many local firms. Nationalization is obviously not good policy in states that are both important host and
home countries of MNEs. It is in the logic of the dialectic view that
the growth of MNEs should, in the end, increase the legitimation
(although not necessarily the power) of the national institutions
dealing with them, in particular in the social field, that of the trade
unions.
42. Contractual international guarantees for foreign (American) capital investments in Germany were unsuccessfully invoked by opponents of codetermination against legislation for its extension passed in March 1976.
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V.

CODES OF CONDUCT

In view of the world-wide operations of MNEs, various types of
international regulations have been proposed for different reasons
by governments, unions, and international businesses alike.13 However, international legislation on this matter seems to be more of
a long-term, if not an idealistic, notion because of differing interest
positions and approaches. In the areas of particular interest to
labor, the same should be true of international conventions requested by an important segment of the international labor movement.4 4 In these circumstances, the idea has evolved to set up
international codes of conduct for MNEs; and several intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, the International Labor Organization, and the OECD have in one or the other
form become interested in these.
The OECD is the first organization to succeed in having such a
code, which was adopted in June 1976. It will be briefly reviewed
here, as far as its industrial relations and employment provisions
are concerned, as an instrument particularly relevant for the countries under consideration.
The OECD guidelines consist of a set of recommendations addressed by the member governments to the MNEs for conducting
business in the OECD area in harmony with the policy objectives
of the countries in which they operate." The guidelines are volun-

tary for the enterprises, not legally enforceable. Simultaneously,
the OECD Council adopted decisions on national treatment of
MNEs, on international investment incentives and disincentives,
and on intergovernmental consultation procedures on the guidelines. Non-discriminatory (national) treatment and the reduction
of barriers to the international flow of capital are longstanding
requests of international business. The adoption of the respective
declarations together with the guidelines stresses the continuing
liberal economic orientation in the OECD countries towards
MNEs and should facilitate the voluntary acceptance of the code
of conduct by the enterprises. The same conclusion applies to the
43. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT (1972).
44. ICFTU, MULTINATIONAL CHARTER 25 (1975). The Charter of trade union
demands for the legislative control of multinational companies was adopted by
the XI ICFTU World Congress in Mexico, Oct. 17-25, 1971.
45. OECD COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT

2 (June 24, 1975).
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statement that the guidelines reflect good practice for all enterprises," multinational or not.
The OECD guidelines recommend, among other things, at least
annual publication of financial statements and other pertinent
information (such as information relating to the structure of the
enterprise, significant new capital investments, employment in
each geographical area, research and development expenditure,
intra-group transfer, pricing, etc.) for the enterprise as a whole,
which is in line with labor requests. More specifically, the guidelines request multinational management: (1) to respect the right
of their employees to be represented by trade unions; (2) to provide
information to employee representatives for meaningful negotiations on conditions of employment and an appreciation of the performance of the enterprise as a whole; (3) to observe standards of
employment and industrial relations as favorable as those observed by comparable employers in the host country; (4) to provide
reasonable notice to employee representatives in cases of collective
layoffs or dismissals and to cooperate with these representatives
and governments to mitigate adverse effects; (5) to refrain from
using the threat of production transfer in dealing with labor; and
(6) to permit authorized employee representatives to conduct
negotiations with management representatives authorized to take
decisions on the matters under negotiation. According to the
Council decision on consultation procedures for guidelines, the
OECD Committee on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises will periodically, or at the request of a member coun-

try, hold meetings for the exchange of views to which the business
and union advisory bodies of the organization will be invited. Individual enterprises will be given the opportunity to express their
views if they wish. However, the Committee is not empowered to
reach conclusions on the conduct of individual enterprises. Thus,
the OECD has established very imperfect international-supervisory machinery concerning the application of its guidelines.
Regarding the labor problems reviewed in the present article, the
guidelines seem to aim primarily at a better integration of MNEs
into the national industrial relations system of the OECD member
countries. They propose, essentially, behavioral standards and
procedural rules for cooperation and conflict regulation with nationally organized labor and general workers' representatives in
46. Paragraph 9 of the Guidelines, OECD PRESS RELEASE A (76)20, Paris, June
21, 1976, at 7.
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the MNE plants. These can certainly mitigate, but do not remove,
the special labor problematique of multinational enterprises. The
recommendation regarding collective layoffs or dismissals is a particularly significant case in point. It illustrates that no restrictions
on the discretionary power of MNEs in the field of international
investment/employment allocations (the major concern of labor)
can be imposed by a voluntary code. Nevertheless, most trade

unions in the OECD countries will certainly welcome the guidelines as a first step in the right direction, although they fall far
short of the claims by organized labor for legislative control over
multinational companies found in the "Multinational Charter" of
trade unions.47 The guidelines, backed by the authority of the
OECD governments, will undoubtedly become a standard document in the discussion of labor problems connected with MNEs.
At the same time they illustrate the weak points of possible nationbased approaches towards these enterprises. Although, under the
present conditions, the policy of alliance with governments (and
international organizations) is preferred by the unions, they maintain that the building up of a countervailing power to that of the
MNEs by the international union movement (especially the trade
secretariats) is also needed through "new forms of organization
based on international workers' solidarity in order to meet the
multinational challenge." 48
VI.

INTERNATIONAL UNION COOPERATION

The rapid growth of MNEs has provided the international trade
union movement with a new concrete purpose and legitimation.
This attitude applies in particular to the free trade unions organized in the ICFTU and the associated international trade secretariats (ITSs), and, to a smaller extent, to the Christian international
organization (WCL), which view the growth of MNEs as a new
phenomenon for organized labor. The Communist-led international union (WFTU) is less involved in this orientation, in part,
because in the Marxist analysis the MNE is not a new separate
phenomenon but an integral aspect of the general problematique
of late capitalism. Action versus MNEs is therefore conceived of

as a part of the class struggle. For this reason alliances with Communist unions, both in matters of principle and in concrete cases

of conflict with MNEs, have generally been refused by the other
international (and national) union organizations. The labor prob47.

MULTINATIONAL CHARTER, supra note 44.

48. Id. at 23.
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lems of MNEs have, thus far, confirmed, rather than helped to
overcome, the ideological splits in the trade union movement in
Western industrialized countries, contrary to some speculations for
the future. 9
Capitalizing on their different action possibilities, the ICFTU
and its associated trade secretariats have developed a division of
work. The ICFTU and its regional organizations, in Europe the
ETUC, have engaged in publicity, development of action programs, and lobbying for world and regional intergovernmental organizations. The influence of the ICFTU was a major factor in
putting the question of MNEs on the agenda of these organizations. The international trade secretariats, especially those for the
chemical, metal, and food industries (and their European counterparts), see their main task in the coordination and initiation of
concrete union action with respect to MNEs and in the creation
of an organizational base for the development of countervailing
power. The formation of world councils for several MNEs or conglomerations moves in this direction, although many of these are
still rather weak 0
Although the position of international union organizations dealing with MNEs has improved in the last years, more so than the
relatively small number of successful international negotiations or
coordinated union actions appears to suggest,5 one cannot overlook the considerable gap between the effective transnational
power of MNEs and that of the unions.5 2 A particular set of circumstances appears to be required for successful international union
strategies. Elements of the strategy are: (1) significant motivation
and mobilization of the workers in the different MNE plants; (2)
effective guiding action by an international trade secretariat 53 or
another international union body; (3) attainment of public opinion
for the union cause; and (4) parallel interest of governments. 5' In
the Akzo case the parallel interest of the Dutch Government to
49. PIEHL, supra note 2, at 302, expects for instance, the future possibility of
union cooperation versus MNEs across ideological divisions.

50. T. Etty & K. Tudyka, supra note 12, at 26, 31-35.
51. Prominent examples are given in PIEHL, supra note 2, at 148-207.
52. Blake, CorporateStructureand InternationalUnions, 7 COLUM. J. WORLD
Bus. 19 (1972).
53. This factor has been judged less important by H.R. Northrup and R.C.
Ronan especially regarding the Akzo case, see supra note 28.
54. H. Gunter, MultinationalCorporationsand Labour: A Worldwide Theme
with Variations, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND LABOR IN AsIAN CouNTRIEs 40 (1976)
(proceedings of the 1975 Asian Regional Conference on Industrial Relations).
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maintain employment in the company's plants at a period of economic difficulties in Holland was a very important factor in the
final outcome.
Although a clear case can be established for the growth of international union action if one considers the incongruence in decision
levels and territorial competence of national unions and MNEs,
this growth should be more the exception than the rule, at least in
the immediate future. A recent study suggests that the motivation
of workers and unions for international action against MNEs
even in the Western countries might be lower than usually assumed because of several new alternatives in the national industrial relations systems. One alternative may be seen in the spread
of "job bargaining," i.e., collectively negotiated guarantees from
employers regarding employment security for workers, which may
include the employers' commitment to job creating investment,"
as is the case in Italy.
Whatever the basic underlying reason-national barriers to
border-crossing union action, or problems of motivation and mobilization-the bulk of the interventions of international trade secretariats now consists in providing information, bargaining assis-

tance, and expertise to local unions facing MNEs, and not in the
coordination of border-crossing activities.56 These have the effect
of strengthening local unions in their regular relations with MNEs
and ultimately contribute to the integration of these enterprises
into the national industrial relations systems.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The preceding review generally does not support views that see
the growth of MNEs as a factor which erodes trade union power
and legitimation in the countries of Western Europe and North
America. Rather, it would appear that the interest representation
role and the capacity of unions to press successfully for social
change are not, on the whole, called into question by the MNEs,
although the properties and strategies of these enterprises cause
problems in a variety of fields (especially employment, job security, and participation). The full problematique of MNEs in respect to the societal change desired by the unions is a very complex
55.

Ulman, Multinational Unionism: Incentives, Barriers, and Alternatives,

14 INDUS. REL. 27 (1975).
56. J. P. LAVIEC, SYNDIcATS ET Socs Tts MULTNATIONALES: LA DOCUMENTATION
FRANcAIsE 97-105 (1975).
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affair entangled with questions of ideological options and controversy.
In the narrower area of industrial relations (determination of
employment conditions and procedures applied in this connection), a rather confusing variety of smaller and larger power and
legitimation problems for the unions arise. Many of these problems
can be solved within the national industrial relations system without disadvantages to the unions, despite the transnational structure of the MNEs. The main approach followed for this purpose is
integration of MNEs into the existing local systems and practices,
a goal in which unions and governments join and one which generally meets with the inclination of multinational management. The
industrial relations implications induced by the example, and
more so by the structural properties of MNEs, are more important,
however, than the behavior of management in the units of the
MNEs. Because of their economic weight and structural properties, the MNEs act as catalysts for tendencies already existing in
the industrial relations systems. Several of these tendencies, such
as the trend towards plant level bargaining, can modify the nature

of these systems and may cause considerable control and adjustment problems for the trade unions.
The cases of concrete conflict between individual MNEs (especially their subsidiaries in the Western European countries) and
organized labor identify the investment/employment complex as a
particularly critical area of MNE/union interaction. The transnational decision power of the enterprises, together-with the lack of
internationally coordinated union action, entail considerable problems for the position of the local trade unions. These problems of
incongruence in decision-making structures and territorial competence are accentuated by an observed change in the attitudes of
the labor unions. Connected with the general employment difficulties of the present recession, a revision of the adjustment ideology of the unions is in progress. Job security and the defense of
employment play a much greater role for the pressured unions
today than in past decades and result in a refusal of certain management mobility requests. It remains to be seen whether a general
revival of economic activity can re-establish behavioral orientation
of adjustment to all employer-demanded change. A second relevant trend is the spread of the participation idea (in whatever
form), instituting workers' influence on economic decisions of
management. Both trends are dysfunctional for the structural
properties and the international strategies of the MNEs.
Despite certain successful moves to improve job and employ-
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ment security in the different countries through collective negotiations and public labor market policies, national unions increasingly recognize that the employment problematiqueof MNEs cannot be solved satisfactorily within the framework of the nationstate (and even less through the available mild forms of international control), although labor occasionally succeeds in imposing
constraints on the transnational mobility of MNEs, usually with
the help of the national governments. Effective international coordination of action versus multinational enterprises remains, therefore, a long-term perspective for the trade unions in the absence
of any other real alternative.

